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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0STATE (3F UTAH
Plaintiff-- Respondent, )
Case No,

VS •

6217

BLAINE OLSEN LARSON,
Defendant--Appellant*

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion,
granted under Utah Code Annotated 77-24-3, in denying defendant's motion to set aside his plea of guilty and substitute
a plea of not guilty,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Blaine Larson, pled guilty to a charge
of knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana; a Class A
misdemeanor.

The plea was entered in Fourth Judicial District

Court of the State of Utah.

The defendant was represented by

counsel, Mr. Gary H. Weight, and fully informed of the consequenses of his plea.

The record recited that the plea was

freely and voluntarily made.
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Prior to the date set for sentencing the defendant
4

became dissatisfied with his counsel's effectiveness in handling the case and obtained new counsel, Mr* Long, Mr. Long then
made a motion to set aside the guilty plea on the grounds that

I
the defendant had supplied his new counsel with information, not
previously known to Mr. Weight, which made it evident that he
had a valid defense to the above-named charge.

The motion was

supported by an affidavit which went uncontradicted by the prosecution.

The affidavit alleged that on the night defendant was

charged with the above-named offense he had been asleep on the
living room couch of the residence where officers came with a
warrant of arrest, and when the officers knocked on the door,
awakening defendant, he put on a pair of overalls which, when
the officers searched them, were found to contain a substance
alleged to have been found on his person.

The defendant did

not inform his original attorney, Mr. Weight, of this fact

^

which offered the defendant a valid defense to the crime of
knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana since he did
not know the marijuana was in the overalls and did not intend

4

to possess it at the time he was searched.
The motion to set aside defendant's guilty plea was
denied and a motion to suppress the evidence which was made concurrently was declared moot.

The defendant was subsequently

sentenced to one year in jail.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
For the Court to reverse the lower court's decision
and grant the Appellant's motion to set aside his plea of
guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty and remand to lower
court for trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, GRANTED
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-24-3, IN REFUSING TO
PERMIT DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY AND
SUBSTITUTE A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY.
A.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS GUILTY PLEA
WAS TIMELY FILED, PRIOR TO THE DATE SET FOR SENTENCING, AND WAS SUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING THAT DEFENDANT HAD A VALID DEFENSE TO THE
OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE WAS CHARGED.

The statute which grants the trial court the discretion to either permit or deny a motion to set aside a guilty
plea is Utah Code Annotated 77-24-3, which reads, "The court
may, at any time before judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted."
Defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea was timely
filed on May 21, 1976 prior to the date set for his sentencing
which was May 28, 197 6.

-3-
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In Utah, as well as the majority of states, the defendant is allowed upon the discretion of the court to also
withdraw a guilty plea following sentencing although not provided for by statute,

Idaho, which has a statute identical

to Utah, Idaho Code Criminal Procedure § 19-1714, has noted
in a Supreme Court decision, State v, Jackson, 96 Idaho 584,
532 P2d 926 (1975), in which the defendant sought to withdraw
a guilty plea to second degree kidnapping prior to sentencing
that a more lenient standard is applied on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to, rather than following, sentencing.

^

The court held in this case that the trial court had abused
its discretion in denying defendant's pre-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where the plea was conditional and did
not admit to the facts on which it was based.

*

The defendant

in the case at hand, should have been allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea because his motion to set aside the plea was timely

4

entered and justice favors resolving doubts in a trial on the
merits of the case.
West's Ann. Pen. Code § 1018, a California Statute,

4

reads similar to Utah's statute, "On application of the defendant at any time before judgment the court may, for good
cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a
plea of not guilty substituted."
In the case of People v. Young, 291 P2d 980 (Dist.
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I

Ct. of App., Cal. 1956), the court held that the trial court
had abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty.

The defendant was allegedly

informed by his attorney preceding trial that the attorney was
ill-prepared to handle his case.

The court in its reasoning

cites West's Ann. Pen. Code § 1018, "The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of
plea from guilty to not guilty.11
Since defendant subsequently discovered he had a valid
defense to the charge of "knowingly and intentionally possessing
marijuana" he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of
guilty in order to avoid injustice since his prior guilty plea
was motivated by ignorance of his defense.
In another California case, People v. McGarrey, 142
P2d 92 (1943), the defendant pled guilty to manslaughter after
conferring with an attorney and not of his own choosing.

When

the trial court refused to allow defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea the court of appeals held that it had abused its
discretion since the defendant's right to be represented by
counsel of his own choice had been invaded.

The court also

noted that, "The withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be
denied in any case where it is in the least evidence that the
ends of justice would be subserved by permitting the defendant
to have pled not guilty instead" (p. 95, supra).
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<*

In the case at hand it is evident that the ends of

'

justice would be served by allowing defendant to withdraw a
plea based upon inadvertence and a mistaken belief that he had
no defense to the charge which he pled guilty to.

In State v.

-

Triplett, 96 Ariz. 199, P.2d 666 (1964) based on a statute similar
to Utah's the defendant pled guilty to kidnapping and the court
held that defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his plea
of guilty.

(

The court noted the reason for its decision was that

psychiatric reports concerning defendant's mental condition at
the time the acts were committed, made after defendant entered a

|

plea of guilty were sufficient to raise a jury question on his
insanity and thereby giving him a defense to the charge of kidnapping.

Defendant in the case at hand is in the same position of

f

discovering a valid defense to the offense he was charged with,
based on information discovered by his new attorney subsequent
to his plea of guilty.

<

The Oklahoma statute is identical to the Utah statute,
Okla Statute.

Annotated Title 22 § 517, and is the basis for

the case of Conley v. State, 444 P.2d 252 (1968).

Defendant

«

plead guilty to receiving stolen property and uttering a
forged instrument.

The court held the trial court should have

allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea since he did
not realize the consequences of his plea could result in seventeen years in the penitentary instead of two years.
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The court

•

noted the standard to be applied in determining whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea is "where
it appears that such a (guilty) plea may have been the result
of inadvertence, ignorance, misunderstanding, misapprehension,
or without deliberation, and it is apparent that application
to withdraw the plea is made, in good faith and not for purpose
of delay or to defeat ends of justice, denial of application
to withdraw a plea of guilty will constitute abuse of discretion" (p. 253, supra).

Applying this standard to the case at

hand it is clear that defendant should have been allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea since it was entered as a result of
inadvertence, ignorance and a basic misunderstanding as to what
his defenses were to the offense to which he pled guilty.
The Idaho Code of Criminal Procedure 19-1714 is identical to the Utah statute involved herein.

In State v. Law-

rence, 220 P2d 380 (1950) an Idaho case defendant pled guilty
to grand larceny and subsequently made a motion to set aside
the judgment.

The court held defendant should have been al-

lowed to withdraw his guilty plea even after judgment since he
lacked familiarity with criminal procedure and his motion was
timely made and no opposition to his affidavits was made by
the State.
In State v. Corvelo, 91 Ariz. 52, 369 P2d 903 £1962),
the defendant pled guilty to receipt of stolen property and
the court held the denial of withdrawal of defendants guilty
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plea was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
because the plea was based on information that did not state
an offense since no description of the property alleged to be
received was included in the indictment*
In a Colorado case, Hutton v. People, 398 P2d 973
(1965) based on a statute similar to Utah, defendant pled guilty
to aggravated robbery.

He made a motion for leave to withdraw

^

the plea to plead guilty to simple robbery since he had not used
a real pistol.

The court held the trial court should have

granted the motion and cited Champion v. People, 236 P2d 127

|

(1951), a Colorado Supreme Court case where defendant pled
guilty to committing mayhem and assault and battery in reliance
on prosecutor's promise that he would be granted probation. The

j

court in that case also held the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea.

The court in Hutton, noted, by way of reason, stated

|

that "misapprehension of what constitutes the offense with
which one is charged would ordinarily move the court to permit
the withdrawal of his plea of guilty" (p. 130, supra).

Clearly

4

the defendant in the case at hand misapprehended the legal es- j
sence of the terms "knowingly and intentionally" when he pled
guilty since he had a defense, based on these concepts•

It is

I

immaterial that he recited in the record that he was aware of
the nature of the offense with which he was charged.
In State v. Ortiz, 77 N.M. 751, 427 P2d 261 (1967),

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

the defendant pled guilty to unauthorized entry of a building
with intent to commit theft in a plea bargain situation where
the district attorney promised to drop a second count of larceny and also made an unkept promise of leniency.

The court

held defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea although upon arraignment when the court asked defendant
if any promise of leniency had been made to the guilty plea he
answered in the negative.

Therefore, courts will not unequiv-

ocally accept statements made by defendants and recited in the
record, if it is later shown that such statements were unfounded.
In Cannon v. State (Okl) 296 P2d 202 (1956, defendant
pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The court held he should have

been allowd to withdraw his guilty plea since he was a nonresident and entered the plea under a false impression of the
consequence.

And although the record showed the trial judge

informed defendant of the consequences of the guilty plea the
defendant was confused.
In Abel v. State, (Okl) 383 P2d 710 (1963), the defendant pled guilty to second degree forgery and the court held
he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea since
he was not properly arraigned or advised of the consequences
of his plea and he had no reasonable time to consult an attorney of his choice.
-9-
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In State v. McBane, 279 P2d 218 (1954), the court

i

held the defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his
plea of guilty to desertion of minor children since he was
not advised of his rights and the nature of the offense charged
with.

*

The court also noted that "all doubts should be resolved

in favor of a trial on its merits" (p. 219, supra) (emphasis
added)•

4
-In Hoag v. State (Okl) 483 P2d 753 (1971), defendant

pled guilty to larceny of personal property and the court held
he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty.

|

The reasons noted were that he was 18 years of age with no
high school education and was represented by a court-appointed
attorney because his parents, who were financially able to

f

hire an attorney of their choice, were not notified.
In

Gray v. State, (Okl) 501 P2d 906 (1972), the defen-

dant pled guilty to grand larceny and the court held the trial

4

court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw the plea because too much haste was involved in handling
the case.

The day following defendant's arrest he waived the

'••

preliminary hearing and entered a guilty plea after talking to
a court-appointed attorney for only five minutes.
In Walker v. State, (Okl) 501 P2d 218 (1972, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of grand larceny and the court
held he should have been able to withdraw his plea because of

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

the swiftness involved in the disposition of his case.

He

consulted a court-appointed attorney on the day following his
arrest for only two minutes before entering his guilty plea*
In People v. Denton, 539 P2d, 1309 (Col. App. 1975),
the defendant pled guilty to first degree burglary and later
made a motion to vacate judgment and sentence.

The court held

that the rule governing acceptance of a guilty plea was not
complied with where defendant's counsel, together with the
trial court, failed to advise defendant of the elements of defense or educate defendant as to the legal definition of the
crimes with which he was charged.

His attorney merely told

defendant the jury would probably convict him if he went to
trial.

This case approaches the case at hand since defendant

was not informed by his first attorney, Mr. Weight, that he
had any legal defenses to the named offense and it was only
later when his subsequent counsel informed him of a valid defense that he decided to plead not guilty.

Had he been aware

of the legal definition of the charge with all of its ramifications and defense to the charge he would not have pled guilty
in the first instance•
In People v. Mason, 491 P2d 1383 (Colo., 1971) , defendant pled guilty to a charge of aggravated robbery.

The

court held he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea since the trial court did not advise defendant of the ele-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

ments of the crime with which he was charged but only inquired
if his attorney had explained them to him.

In the case at hand

the court did explain to the defendant that "knowing and intentional possession" were elements of the crime but failed to in-

I
form the defendant, or inquire if he had been informed by his
attorney, of the possible defenses which he may have to the
charge*

4
In State v. Barnes, 134 So 2d 890 (La., 1961), the defendant pled guilty to a charge of embezzlement.

The court

held he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
because the nature of the crime was unknown to him and he had
an adequate defense.
In Jordan v. State, 107 So 2d 56 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1958), the defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of
moonshine whiskey and the court held she should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea.

Reasons advanced for the

-

court's decision were the fact that she was illiterate, not
advised of her rights or the consequences of. her plea, and a
question existed as to whether the search was valid.

^

A case in point with the case at hand is State v.
Virgietal and State v. Dottare, 840 A 14, 81 Ne 2d 295 (1948),
decided in the Court of Appeals of Ohio.

This case is based

4

on an Ohio statute, Ohio Rules of Crim. P r o c , Rule 32.1:
"Withdrawal to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be

4
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made only before sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea,"

This statute has the same effect as the Utah statute

in giving the trial court discretion to allow or refuse to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.
The defendant in the Virg. case pled guilty to a
charge of larceny by trick and the issue to be decided was
whether the Court of Common Pleas prejudicially erred in denying the defendants permission to withdraw their pleas of guilty
and substitute pleas of not guilty.

The motion for leave to

withdraw the guilty pleas was made prior to sentencing and the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendants to withdraw their
guilty pleas.

The court stated its reasons for holding that

•the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for
leave to withdraw the guilty pleas which are as follows:
The defendants' motions for leave to withdraw their
pleas: of guilty were timely filed prior to the date set for
sentencing.

Affidavits were filed, supporting the motions,

which contained statements alleging the defendants had discovered new evidence which constituted a valid defense to the
charge in the indictment.

The affidavits were unchallenged by

counter-affidavits or evidence.

And the defendants' counsel

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stated defendants1 dissatisfaction with his representation of
them and their desire to employ other counsel and proceed to
trial.

New counsel appeared and urged that the defendants were

entitled to a trial on the merits.

All these reasons cited by

the court for holding the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant defendants' motion for leave to withdraw
their guilty pleas are present in the case at hand.

Defendant

filed his motion timely prior to sentencing and the motion was
supported by an uncontroverted affidavit alleging that the defendant had discovered a valid defense to the named charge.
Also defendant was dissatisfied with his attorney and proceeded
to employ new counsel who advised him of his defense to the .
charge in the event that he should plead not guilty.

Whereupon

defendant made a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea
which was wrongfully refused by the trial court.
I I

•

•

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, GRANTED
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-24-3, IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
A.

DEFENDANT'S FIRST COUNSEL, EMPLOYED AT THE TIME
HE ENTERED THE GUILTY PLEA, WAS INEFFECTIVE IN
HANDLING DEFENDANT'S CASE.

Defendant's counsel, employed at the time he entered
his plea of guilty, was ineffective in handling his case be-

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cause he was not aware of certain pertinent facts which imbued defendant with a defense to the charge and was therefore
unable to advise defendant of his defense and the desirability
of entering a plea of not guilty.
In the case of In Re Cronin, 336 A 2d 164, (Vermont,
1975), the court, in applying the same standard to juvenile
cases, remanded the case to the trial court, in which the defendant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty, to determine the
effectiveness of his counsel in handling his case.

The court

reasoned that the guilty plea could not be deemed to have been
voluntarily made if the defendant's counsel was ineffective in
his particular case although he may be a compentent counsel in
general.
In State v. Kincheloe, 87 N.M. 34, 528 P2d 893 (1974),
the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault on a peace officer.

A subsequent attorney secured by the defendant had

filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty on the grounds
that the court-appointed attorney, employed at the time the
plea was entered and who had died prior to sentencing, did not
discuss with defendant his various defenses but instead told
him he would be found guilty.

The court held the trial court

abused its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty since he did not have effective assistance of counsel at the time the plea was entered and therefore

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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it could not have been freely, intelligently or knowingly
given.

In the case at hand defendant was not represented by

effective counsel under the circumstances at the time his plea
was entered which is evidenced by the fact that the attorney
which he employed subsequent to entering the guilty plea advised him of his valid defense to the charge.

Since the defen-

dant was not effectively represented at the time he pled guilty
the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, thus he should
have been allowed to withdraw the guilty plea and proceed to
trial on the merits by substituting a plea of not guilty.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, in the interest of promoting the ends
of justice should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of
guilty and proceed to trial.

Defendant has a valid defense to

the named charge and he should be allowed to assert that defense
in a trial on the merits of his case.

There is no reason to

deny him the opportunity to try his case before a jury since his
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was timely filed, prior to
the date set for sentencing, and supported by an affidavit stating ample grounds for granting the motion.

The defendant was

not aware that he had a valid defense to the charge at the time
he entered the guilty plea.

This lack of awareness, due to the

fact that his attorney at that time was not adequately informed
and therefore ineffective, vitiated any voluntariness on the
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

part of the defendant in entering the plea of guilty.

Since

the District Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's
motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, the court's error
should be remedied by allowing defendant to substitute a plea
of not guilty and proceed to trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

N / LONG
Attorrr^y for Defendant-Appellant
731 East South T-efriple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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